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The Sense of Agency (SoA) is the experience of controlling one s movements and their external 36 
consequences. Accumulating evidence suggests that freedom to act enhances SoA, while prediction 37 
errors are known to reduce it. Here, we investigated if prediction errors related to movement or to the 38 
achievement of the goal of the action exert the same influence on SoA during free and cued actions. 39 
Participants pressed a freely chosen or cued color button, while observing a virtual hand moving in 40 
the same or in the opposite direction  i.e., movement-related prediction error  and pressing the 41 
selected or a different color  i.e., goal-related prediction error. To investigate implicit and explicit 42 
components of SoA, we collected indirect (i.e., Synchrony Judgments) and direct (i.e., Judgments of 43 
Causation) measures. We found that participants judged virtual actions as more synchronous when 44 
they were free to act. Additionally, movement-related prediction errors reduced both perceived 45 
synchrony and judgments of causation, while goal-related prediction errors impaired exclusively the 46 
latter. Our results suggest that freedom to act enhances SoA and that movement and goal-related 47 
prediction errors lead to an equivalent reduction of SoA in free and cued actions. Our results also 48 
show that the influence of freedom to act and goal achievement may be limited respectively to implicit 49 
and explicit SoA, while movement information may affect both components. These findings provide 50 
support to recent theories that view SoA as a multifaceted construct, by showing that different action 51 
cues may uniquely influence the feeling of control.   52 
 53 
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1. INTRODUCTION  67 
The Sense of Agency (SoA) is the experience of controlling one s movements and their consequences 68 
in the external environment (Aarts et al., 2012; Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Tsakiris, Longo, & Haggard, 69 
2010). Recent theoretical models suggest that SoA is a multi-faceted experience that comprises both 70 
implicit and explicit components (Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008a, 71 
2008b; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Voss, 2013; Wegner & Sparrow, 2004). Specifically, it has been 72 
proposed that SoA involves an implicit, non-conceptual component  i.e., feeling of agency   that 73 
relies mostly on sensorimotor information, and an explicit, conceptual and interpretative component 74 
 i.e., judgment of agency  that relies on the formation of beliefs about the causes of actions and their 75 
consequences (Synofzik et al., 2008a, 2008b). This distinction implies that SoA may depend on a set 76 
of multiple cues, such as contextual information and a comparison between the predicted and actual 77 
consequences of actions (Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2013). This work focuses on the 78 
contribution to SoA of different prediction errors  movement and goal-related  within free and cued 79 
contexts of action.   80 
Previous research consistently reported that prediction errors influence SoA. Prediction errors can 81 
broadly be defined as a mismatch between prior expectations and reality (den Ouden, Kok, & de 82 
Lange, 2012). Within the active inference  framework of perception and action (Friston, 2010, 2012; 83 
Friston, Samothrakis, & Montague, 2012), prediction errors can be considered as the discrepancy 84 
between the bottom-up sensory input and the top-down predictions made by the brain about that input 85 
(Friston, 2011; Wolpe & Rowe, 2014a). Prediction errors are thought to play a central role in motor 86 
control, by signaling the difference between the predicted and the actual outcome of the action 87 
(Haggard, 2017; Wolpe & Rowe, 2014b). Interestingly, a recent study revealed that prediction errors 88 
also occur in a dyadic motor interaction when a virtual partner performs an unexpected action., i.e. 89 
violating the initial prediction (Moreau, Candidi, Era, Tieri, & Aglioti, 2019). Indeed, it is generally 90 
assumed that the brain forms predictions about how the action will unfold and about its sensory 91 
consequences (Blakemore & Frith, 2003; Blakemore & Sirigu, 2003; Wolpert, Ghahramani, & 92 
Jordan, 1995). Predictions are then compared with the actual events. If they match, no prediction error 93 
is generated, conversely, error signals are generated. According to one of the most popular theories 94 
of SoA  the Comparator Model (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 95 
2000)  prediction errors contribute both to adjust behavior and to modulate SoA. In particular, SoA 96 
would be experienced in the absence of prediction errors, and it would be reduced by their occurrence. 97 
Indeed, SoA was found to be reduced by movement-related prediction errors  i.e., by the observation 98 
of unpredicted movements that do not correspond to the ones executed by the participants (Daprati et 99 




































































Jeannerod, 2002)  and by outcome-related prediction errors  i.e., by the occurrence of unexpected 101 
outcomes following participant s action (Caspar, Desantis, Dienes, Cleeremans, & Haggard, 2016; 102 
David et al., 2016; Kühn et al., 2011; Sato & Yasuda, 2005).  103 
However, the idea that prediction errors systematically reduce SoA has been criticized by Synofzik 104 
and colleagues (Synofzik et al., 2008a), who observed that the comparator model fails to explain 105 
situations where people experience SoA despite small prediction errors, or the finding that individuals 106 
may experience a vicarious  SoA for observed actions even in absence of real movements (Tieri, 107 
Tidoni, Pavone, & Aglioti, 2015; Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004). Similarly, the comparator 108 
model may fail to account for the influence on SoA of low level bodily signals, such as breath (Monti, 109 
Porciello, Tieri, & Aglioti, 2020). Hence, SoA may depend on many sources of information, which 110 
would include  but would not be limited to  prediction errors.  111 
In a previous study (Villa, Tidoni, Porciello, & Aglioti, 2018) we tested the influence on SoA of three 112 
types of prediction errors, namely, prediction errors about i) movement execution, ii) goal 113 
achievement, and iii) the time in which these events should occur. We devised a novel paradigm, the 114 
SoA-GAME  i.e., Sense of Agency for Goal Achievement and Movement Execution  in which 115 
participants performed simple goal-directed actions. Their task was to press a button of a cued color 116 
and to observe a virtual hand performing the same or a different action from a first-person perspective. 117 
Specifically, the virtual finger could move in the same or in the opposite direction with respect to the 118 
participants  finger and the color pressed in the virtual scenario could be the one selected by the 119 
participants or a different one. Additionally, delays of increasing duration were introduced between 120 
the executed and virtual action. By orthogonally manipulating movement (same/opposite), goal 121 
(achieved/missed) and time information (synchronous/delayed), we were able to measure the unique 122 
contribution of these cues to SoA. Tellingly, our data indicated that both movement and goal-related 123 
prediction errors reduce SoA, but also that movement information seems to be a more constant source 124 
of SoA modulation than goal information.  125 
It is important to underline that in our previous version of the task the goal of participant s action was 126 
defined by an external cue. Hence, it is unclear whether the same effects could be observed also for 127 
freely chosen actions.  128 
Being internally generated and independent from environmental influences (Fried, Haggard, He, & 129 
Schurger, 2017; Haggard, 2017) voluntary actions have been often identified by contrasting them to 130 
reflexes and to actions guided by external cues, i.e., cued actions (Fried et al., 2017; Frith, 2013). 131 
Voluntariness is often viewed as a fundamental cue to SoA (Haggard, 2017) and indeed accumulating 132 
evidence suggests that freedom to act enhances SoA.   133 




































































obtain a visual outcome on screen (Wenke, Fleming, & Haggard, 2010) or to press one of  two buttons 135 
following an instruction. Participants reported higher control over the outcome when they were free 136 
to act as compared to when they followed an instruction. In a series of studies, Barlas and colleagues 137 
(Barlas, Hockley, & Obhi, 2017, 2018; Barlas & Obhi, 2013) compared intentional binding between 138 
freely chosen and cued actions. Intentional binding (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Moore & 139 
Obhi, 2012) is a perceived time compression between the action and its outcome. Although recent 140 
evidence suggests that intentional binding may simply reflect multisensory integration associated to 141 
causal inference (Kirsch, Kunde, & Herbort, 2019; Poonian & Cunnington, 2013; Suzuki, Lush, Seth, 142 
& Roseboom, 2019), intentional binding was classically considered an implicit marker of SoA. 143 
Participants reported stronger binding when they were free to decide which action to perform, 144 
suggesting that freedom to act was associated to higher implicit SoA. The same trend was observed 145 
when participants provided explicit judgments of agency (Barlas et al., 2017, 2018).   146 
In line with these findings, recent studies show that SoA is significantly reduced when participants 147 
are coerced to perform an action. In a series of experiments, Caspar and colleagues asked  participants  148 
to perform button presses that could result either in an mildly painful electrical shock delivered to a 149 
co-participant or in taking part of his/her remuneration (Caspar, Christensen, Cleeremans, & Haggard, 150 
2016; Caspar, Cleeremans, & Haggard, 2018; Caspar, Vuillaume, Magalhães De Saldanha da Gama, 151 
& Cleeremans, 2017). Simultaneously to the harmful outcome participants heard a tone and were 152 
asked to estimate the time interval between action and tone and thus provide a measure of intentional 153 
binding. Importantly, actions could be executed in a context of freedom of choice, or upon a specific 154 
request by the experimenter (i.e., coercive condition). Intentional binding was significantly reduced 155 
when participants were coerced to perform an action as compared to the freedom of choice context. 156 
Together, these studies bring additional evidence that freedom to act is crucial for SoA.   157 
However, previous studies did not systematically investigate if the enhancement of SoA generated 158 
by freedom to act is also linked to changes of the impact on SoA of failures to control one s own 159 
movements or to achieve the goal of the action. In other words, it is not clear whether movement and 160 
goal-related prediction errors are equally effective in reducing SoA within free and cued contexts of 161 
action. In a previous study, Barlas and Kopp (2018) reported that SoA  measured by means of 162 
intentional binding and of explicit reports of their feeling of control  was independently reduced 163 
when participants freedom to act was limited and when incongruent outcomes occurred. However, 164 
Barlas and Kopp study did not allow a direct comparison of movement and goal related prediction 165 
errors, since their task only included the presentation to participants of incongruent outcomes. Here, 166 
we adapted our SoA-GAME paradigm so that participants could perform actions both in contexts of 167 




































































of movement, goal and time-related prediction errors when the individual performs free or cued 169 
actions. As mentioned earlier, SoA may include implicit and explicit components. To capture the 170 
effects of our manipulations on these two components of SoA we employed two measures. In the first 171 
session of the experiment participants were asked to judge if the observed virtual action took place 172 
simultaneously to their action or with a delay. This measure, referred to as synchrony judgments 173 
(Villa et al., 2018) allowed us to collect information about participants  implicit SoA. Indeed, a 174 
previous study suggested that synchrony judgments rely on the same source of information involved 175 
in expressing agency judgments (Weiss, Tsakiris, Haggard, & Schütz-Bosbach, 2014). This 176 
conclusion was based on fMRI data showing that the inferior parietal cortex was activated both when 177 
participants noticed delays between their action and visual feedback of their action and when 178 
participants reported a reduction of SoA by attributing the observed action to someone else (Farrer et 179 
al., 2008). Consistently, a recent study found that the ability to detect delays is negatively correlated 180 
with explicit agency ratings  the better participants were at detecting delays between action and 181 
outcome, the less they reported to feel in control when delays occurred (Osumi et al., 2019). Hence, 182 
previous evidence suggested that Synchrony Judgments may allow to measure implicit SoA. In the 183 
second session of the experiment we collected a direct measure of explicit SoA by asking participants 184 
to rate their feeling of causing the virtual actions by means of a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) 185 
(similarly to Pezzetta et al., 2018). This measure was adapted from previous studies that investigated 186 
explicit SoA over the movements of a virtual (Salomon et al., 2016; Tieri et al., 2015), robotic 187 
(Caspar, Cleeremans, & Haggard, 2015) or rubber hand (Braun, Thorne, Hildebrandt, & Debener, 188 
2014; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012, 2014). By adding this measure, which was not present in our 189 
previous version of the task (Villa et al., 2018), we sought to capture the similarities and differences 190 
between the effects induced by our manipulations respectively on implicit and explicit SoA.    191 
We hypothesized that freely chosen actions would be associated with higher SoA (i.e., higher 192 
perceived synchrony/higher judgments of causation) as compared to cued actions and that participants 193 
would experience a decrease of SoA (i.e., lower perceived synchrony/lower judgments of causation) 194 
after observing both movement and goal-related prediction errors similarly to our previous findings 195 
(Villa et al., 2018). However, in line with recent evidence (Beck, Di Costa, & Haggard, 2017; 196 
Borhani, Beck, & Haggard, 2017) we also expected that information about achievement of the goal 197 
of the action would influence SoA more in free than in cued actions: we expected that participants 198 
report higher synchrony/judgments of causation when they achieve a freely chosen goal as compared 199 
to a cued goal, and that a failure to achieve the goal may lead to a sharper reduction of the reported 200 
synchrony/judgments of causation in the free than in the cued context of action. However, we also 201 




































































self-attribute successful outcomes (Arkin, Appelman, & Burger, 1980; Miller & Ross, 1975), 203 
information about goal achievement may affect more SoA at an explicit level. Finally, considering 204 
that SoA and motor performance may both be influenced by the same type of prediction errors 205 
(Haggard, 2017), we tested whether our manipulations could also induce post-error adjustments . 206 
Making an error is known to affect performance in following trials, which is generally referred to as 207 
post-error adjustments (Danielmeier & Ullsperger, 2011; Fusco et al., 2018; Ullsperger, Danielmeier, 208 
& Jocham, 2014). For instance, participants perform actions more slowly in trials following an error, 209 
an effect known as Post-Error Slowing (PES). Interestingly, post-error adjustments were also reported 210 
after prediction errors and unexpected visual consequences of actions (Gentsch, Ullsperger, & 211 
Ullsperger, 2009; Padrao, Gonzalez-Franco, Sanchez-Vives, Slater, & Rodriguez-Fornells, 2016; 212 
Wessel & Aron, 2013; Wessel, Danielmeier, Morton, & Ullsperger, 2012).  We measured behavioral 213 
adjustments by calculating the amount of time participants took to a) provide synchrony judgments  214 
i.e., Judgment Times  and b) perform a new action after observation of every type of virtual action 215 
 i.e., post observation Reaction Times. We expected that movement and goal-related prediction 216 
errors would be associated to increased Judgment Times and post observation Reaction Times. In 217 
principle, one possibility was that our manipulations would generate the same effects on behavioral 218 
adjustments and on SoA. However, in light of recent theories that suggest that the magnitude of error 219 
signals may not necessarily translate in an equivalent reduction of SoA (Synofzik et al., 2008a, 220 
2008b), movement and goal-related prediction errors would have a different impact on behavioral 221 
adjustments and SoA, respectively. 222 
 223 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 224 
2.1 Participants  225 
To estimate the sample size, we performed a power analysis (MorePower 6.0.4, Campbell & 226 
Thompson, 2012). We used the effect size of the significant interaction between factors Goal and 227 
Delay, i.e., p2 of 0.123, reported in our previous analysis of Synchrony Judgments where we 228 
employed the SoA-GAME (Villa et al., 2018). We chose to focus on this measure because Synchrony 229 
Judgments was the only measure of SoA that we employed in our previous study. Moreover, we chose 230 
this effect size because i) the interaction between factors Goal and Delay was the highest-order 231 
statistically significant interaction; and that ii) this interaction showed the smallest effect size among 232 
the significant effects observed in our previous data making maximally conservative our choice. Thus, 233 
to achieve a power of 0.80 for this effect and considering the 2x2x2x3 design (see below) of our 234 




































































(see the section 2.3 Procedure and Task) we decided to collect data from 45 participants. All 236 
participants were right-handed, had no prior history of neurological or psychiatric disorders, had 237 
normal or corrected to normal visual acuity and were not color-blind. Participants were naïve with 238 
respect to the purposes of the study and explanations of the hypotheses were provided at the end of 239 
the experiment. The experimental protocol was approved by the ethics committee of Fondazione 240 
Santa Lucia (Prot. CE/PROG. 686) and was performed in accordance with the 1964 declaration of 241 
Helsinki. All participants read and provided written informed consent to take part in the study. Five 242 
participants were excluded from the final sample and from the analyses since they failed to meet pre-243 
defined exclusion criteria (for details see the Excluded Participants  section of the supplementary 244 
materials). The final sample was thus composed of 40 participants (20 males; age range: 19-31 years; 245 
mean ± S.E.M: 23.7 ± 0.408).  246 
2.2 Apparatus 247 
A Matlab (The MathWorks, Inc) custom script was used to run the experiment. A virtual scenario 248 
(Fig. 1) created by means of 3DS Max 2011 (Autodesk, Inc) was shown on a monitor (Benq GL 249 
2250-T; refresh rate, 60 Hz; resolution set to 1280 × 720 pixels). This included a virtual humanoid 250 
right-limb (forearm and hand) and a virtual response box, composed of two dark grey buttons 251 
respectively attached to the top and to the bottom of a transparent structure. The index of the virtual 252 
hand laid between the two buttons of the virtual response box.    253 
The monitor was sustained by a wooden structure located on the table, so that it was inclined of 12.7° 254 
with respect to the horizontal plane. Participants inserted their right arm in a rectangular hole at the 255 
front of the structure (58 × 8.5 cm). They were asked to lay their arm on the table in order to match 256 
the position of the virtual arm. The presence of the screen prevented participants to observe their real 257 
arm and a piece of black cloth was used to cover their shoulders and the elbow joints to prevent any 258 
visual discontinuity between the virtual limb and participants  body. A custom-made response box, 259 
closely matching the features of the virtual response box, was placed on the table below the monitor. 260 
The response box was C-shaped and included two identical USB numeric pads. The keys of the two 261 
devices faced each other s. The upper pad was sustained at a height of 7 cm by a plastic support fixed 262 
on the table. Two plastic buttons (height: 1.5 cm), with a squared and flat top face (side length: 3.2 263 
cm) were attached respectively to the 2  and 5  keys of the lower and upper pads and allowed to 264 
record downward and upward movements of the index finger. Before starting the experiment, the 265 
distance between the surfaces of the two plastic buttons was adapted for each participant by inserting 266 
paper supports below the lower pad, so that the dorsal part of the distant phalanx of the index touched 267 
the superior button, while the ventral part rested on the inferior button, and the two plastic buttons 268 




































































allowed participants to answer to the specific question that appeared on screen at the end of a trial 270 
(See "Procedure and task  and Fig. 1 for details).  271 
-------------------------- 272 
Please insert Fig. 1 about here 273 
-------------------------- 274 
2.3 Procedure and task 275 
The experiment was performed in a dimly lit room. Participants sat comfortably on a chair, at a 276 
viewing distance of approximately 40 cm from the center of the screen.  277 
During the experiment, the two virtual buttons turned to yellow and blue, respectively. Participants  278 
task was to select one of the two virtual buttons according to its color and to press the real button in 279 
the corresponding position as fast as possible, by performing an upward or downward movement. In 280 
separate blocks, participants could either freely select which color to press  i.e., Free Block  or 281 
select the color according to an imperative cue  i.e., Cued Block (see below for details). Pressing the 282 
real button triggered the observation of an action (visual feedback) in the virtual scenario. The virtual 283 
action could be similar or different from the one performed by the participant and it took place as 284 
soon as a button press was detected or with different possible delays (see the section 2.4 Action-285 
Outcome manipulation for details). Then, an indirect  Synchrony Judgments, SJs  or direct  286 
Judgments of Causation, JoC  measure of SoA was collected (see below and Fig. 2, panel A for 287 
details). These two measures were collected separately in two different sessions of the experiment  288 
the SJ session and JoC Session  each composed of a Free and Cued block. The order of Free and 289 
Cued blocks within the two sessions was counterbalanced across participants, while the two sessions 290 
followed a fixed order: participants always performed the SJ session before the JoC session (see Fig. 291 
2, panel A). By keeping the order of SJ and JoC sessions fixed, we aimed at controlling potential 292 
response biases that could have been induced in the expression of synchrony judgments by the prior 293 
exposure to the explicit measure of SoA (for a similar approach, see Braun et al., 2014).  294 
Specifically, in the SJ session participants provided SJs by judging as fast as possible if the observed 295 
visual change in the virtual scenario  took place simultaneously to their action or delayed. They 296 
were informed that by change in the virtual scenario  we referred to the fact that contingently on 297 
their button press, they would observe the virtual index pressing a virtual button of a certain color. 298 
We considered that using this terminology - instead of observed action  - would not bias participants 299 
to focus on the movement of the virtual finger over the color of the pressed virtual button.   300 




































































between their action and the visual change in the virtual scenario, irrespective of the type of observed 302 
action. Two keys of a standard USB keyboard were respectively labeled S  for Synchronous and 303 
A  for Asynchronous, and participants used their left index and the middle fingers to respond. The 304 
finger (Index/Middle) used to respond Synchronous  was fully counterbalanced across participants. 305 
Additionally, to check that participants were aware of the disposition of the colors when performing 306 
a button press, we added a control question. In a sub-set of trials participants were asked to report if 307 
the final disposition of the colors - observed following the virtual action - was reversed with respect 308 
to the initial one - observed before performing the action  (see the section 2.4 Action-Outcome 309 
Manipulation  for more details). To answer to this question participants used the same fingers and 310 
keys as for SJs. They pressed S for Yes  (the final disposition was reversed with respect to the initial 311 
one) and A for No  (the disposition of the two colors did not change).  312 
In the JoC session participants expressed judgments of causation. After each virtual action 313 
observation, they were asked to rate how much they felt they had caused the visual change in the 314 
virtual scenario. Participants were informed that they could choose between all the values of a 100 315 
points VAS spanning from 0 ( Not at all ) to 100 ( Completely ) and to press a third key, labelled 316 
enter , to confirm their answer. As for SJs, we referred to the visual change to avoid that participants 317 
would focus on the movement of the virtual finger over the color of the pressed virtual button.  318 
2.3.1 Cued Block 319 
The structure of a typical trial in the Cued block was as follows. A tone signaled the beginning of the 320 
trial, and at the same time a blue or yellow circle (i.e., a cue) appeared at the left of the virtual response 321 
box, at the same height of the virtual index and at equal distance from the two virtual buttons. The 322 
color of the circle instructed participants about which real button they should press in the current trial 323 
- i.e., if yellow, they had to press the real button that was in the same position of the virtual button 324 
that turned to yellow; if blue, they had to press the real button that was in the same position of the 325 
virtual button that turned to blue. The color of the circle was random for each trial and participants 326 
observed an equal number of times the two types of cues. The circle remained visible for 1000 ms 327 
and then disappeared. After a random time (included between 1000 and 1500 ms) the two virtual 328 
buttons flashed, one of them turning blue and the other yellow, for 120 ms. The two possible 329 
dispositions of the colors (yellow up, blue down and vice-versa) were presented an equal number of 330 
times, and their order of presentation was randomized for each participant. The colors of the two 331 
virtual buttons then returned dark grey, and participants had to press the real button corresponding to 332 
the position of the cued color with an upward or downward movement. If no response was provided 333 




































































button (e.g., the cued color appeared above the virtual index finger, but the participant pressed the 335 
lower real button) a prohibition sign  was displayed for 2000 ms and the trial was aborted. Aborted 336 
trials were repeated at the end of the block. When participants pressed the cued button, a visual 337 
feedback simultaneous or delayed with respect to the button press was provided (see the section 2.4 338 
Action-Outcome Manipulation and Fig. 2, panel C). The visual feedback remained visible for 500 339 
ms. Then, the virtual hand and the virtual response box were covered by a black (for SJs and JoC) or 340 
grey (for control questions) rectangle and participants were asked to respond to the current question. 341 
The inter-trial interval (ITI) was set to 1000 ms.  342 
2.3.2 Free Block 343 
The structure of a typical trial in the Free block was identical to the one described for the Cued block, 344 
with only one difference: in the Free block, the color of the circle appearing at the beginning of the 345 
trial was half yellow and half blue. The orientation of the circle (whether the left half was yellow or 346 
blue, See Fig. 2, panel B) was random for each trial and participants observed an equal number of 347 
times the two types of circles. This symbol was introduced to maintain a perceptual similarity with 348 
respect to the Cued block, and participants were asked to use it as a reminder that they should decide 349 
which color to press in that trial. The orientation of the virtual hand was identical with respect to the 350 
one employed in the Cued block. As in the Cued block, participants had to respond within three 351 
seconds, or the trial would be aborted. Participants were asked to: i) freely choose which color to 352 
press in each trial; ii) refrain from using a predefined strategy in choosing the color and iii) avoid 353 
pressing always the same color. Adherence to these constraints was assessed at the end of the 354 
experiment for each participant. After participants pressed the chosen button they were shown a visual 355 
feedback (see the section 2.4 Action-Outcome Manipulation and Fig. 2, panel C) and they were asked 356 
to respond to the SJs/JoC or control question.  357 
2.4 Action-Outcome Manipulation 358 
Pressing one of the two buttons of the response box triggered the observation of a visual feedback 359 
which could be simultaneous or delayed with respect to button press (0 ms, + 150 ms, +300 ms). 360 
Indeed, the virtual finger could move in the same (M+) or in the opposite (M-) direction with respect 361 
to participant s movement and the goal could be achieved (G+) or missed (G-) depending on whether 362 
the virtual hand pressed the selected or the other color. The combination of movement and goal 363 
manipulations resulted in four possible types of feedback: one was fully correct (M+G+), while three 364 
were erroneous (M+G-, M-G+, M-G-; see Fig. 2, panel C for a graphical representation of the four 365 
types of feedback).  366 




































































participants performed practice trials before starting each of the two blocks that composed the SJ 368 
session. In these trials, the first 2 button presses were always followed by the observation of 369 
simultaneous M+G+ feedback; in twelve trials participants observed each of the possible Feedback x 370 
Delay combinations (e.g., M+G+, delay 0, for a total of 12 possible combinations), and in 1 trial 371 
participants responded to the control question. Since participants could make errors, fail to perform 372 
an action within the given response window, or need to adjust the position of the hand to facilitate 373 
button presses, the overall number of trials during practice was not the same for all participants. They 374 
performed on average 15 trials (range: 15-17; ± S.E.M.: 0.106) before starting the free block and 16 375 
trials (range: 15-24; ± S.E.M.: 0.277) before starting the free block. Data from practice trials were not 376 
included in the analysis.  377 
In each session of the experiment (SJ/JoC) and in each block (Free/Cued), the order of appearance of 378 
each Feedback x Delay combination was randomized. In the cued blocks, the color to press and the 379 
corresponding visual feedback were known before the participant performed the action. In the free 380 
blocks, the visual feedback was determined online according to the color chosen by the participant.  381 
To help participants familiarize with the experimental procedure, in each block the first 4 button 382 
presses were always followed by simultaneous M+G+ feedback. These trials were excluded from the 383 
analysis. In the SJ session each Feedback x Delay combination was presented 24 times, for a total of 384 
288 trials (144 trials in each block, 12 trials per condition). Additionally, in 16 trials (8 per block, 2 385 
per each type of feedback) participants were asked to respond to the control question aimed at 386 
assessing participants  awareness of the disposition of the colors. No delays between action and 387 
feedback were introduced when participants were required to respond to the control question. During 388 
the JoC session each Feedback x Delay combination was presented 8 times, for a total of 96 trials (48 389 
trials in each block). 390 
-------------------------- 391 
Please insert Fig. 2 about here 392 
-------------------------- 393 
2.5 Data Handling  394 
Although the number of trials for each Feedback x Delay combination was fixed, the total number of 395 
trials was not identical for each participant (for instance, participants could make errors in the cued 396 
blocks, or they could fail to perform an action within the given response window of 3 seconds  i.e., 397 
action failures). Participants performed on average 318 trials in the SJ session (Block: total trials 398 




































































106 trials in the JoC session (Free block: 52-53, 52 ± 0.053; Cued block: 52-61, 54 ± 0.328). We 400 
removed from the analysis i) real errors (in cued blocks) ii) action failures iii) trials where the 401 
experiment was suspended to adjust the position of participant s index finger to favor optimal 402 
reception of button presses i.e., interruptions (see table S2 in the supplementary materials for details). 403 
Finally, we analyzed participants  accuracy in responding to the control questions separately with 404 
respect to the rest of the trials (see paragraph 3.5).   405 
After trial removal, analyses were performed on 288 trials per participant for the SJ session and on 406 
96 trials for the JoC session.    407 
We analyzed four dependent variables: three in the SJ sessions and one in the JoC sessions. For SJ 408 
trials, for each condition we calculated 1) the proportion of Synchronous  answers to the synchrony 409 
judgments (i.e., SJs); 2) the mean amount of time participants took to provide an answer after 410 
observing a visual feedback in the virtual scenario (i.e., Judgment Times, JTs) and 3) the mean amount 411 
of time participants took to perform a new action in the trial that followed the observation of each 412 
specific type of feedback (post observation Reaction Times, poRTs). For JoC trials, we calculated the 413 
mean value representing the feeling of causing the virtual action for each condition (i.e., JoC).  414 
Mean values were calculated for each dependent variable, for each subject in each of the 24 conditions 415 
resulting from the combination of 4 independent variables: Context (Free/Cued), Movement 416 
(Congruent, Incongruent), Goal (Achieved/Missed) and Delay (+0 ms, +150 ms, +300 ms). Before 417 
running parametrical statistical tests, we checked normality assumption by verifying that at least one 418 
of the following criteria was met (Field et al., 2013), namely that Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was not 419 
significant and that z-scores for skewness and kurtosis were included between -2.58 and +2.58. No 420 
condition violated the abovementioned criteria in JoC, while several conditions were not normally 421 
distributed for all dependent variables in the SJ session. To correct for this, SJs values were 422 
transformed by means of an ipsatization procedure (similarly to Tieri et al., 2015), an intra-subject 423 
standardization method that is carried out by subtracting the subject mean across conditions from the 424 
value obtained in a specific condition (Fischer, 2004; Fischer & Milfont, 2010). Following the 425 
ipsatization procedure, positive scores indicate that the participant showed a higher perceived 426 
synchrony in that condition with respect to her/his mean, while negative scores indicate that the 427 
participant showed a lower perceived synchrony in that condition with respect to her/his mean. Hence, 428 
we calculated the mean reported synchrony for each subject across conditions, and we subtracted it 429 
from the individual values obtained in each condition (see Villa et al., 2018 for a similar appoach). 430 
After the ipsatization procedure 4 out of 24 conditions were still not normally distributed. Given the 431 
small number of conditions not meeting the normality assumption and the high number of conditions 432 




































































validity of our results on SJs, we also conducted a non-parametrical analysis that can be found in the 434 
Supplementary Materials. For JTs and poRTs we applied a square root transformation to the raw 435 
mean values so that no deviations from normality were found. SJs, JTs, poRTs and JoC data were 436 
entered into 4 separate 2x2x2x3 repeated measures Analysis of Variance (Anovas), with Context, 437 
Movement, Goal and Delay as within-subjects factors. The level of significance was set to .05 and 438 
Tukey correction was applied to all post-hoc comparisons. Statistical analyses were run using 439 
STATISTICA 8. 440 
 441 
3. RESULTS 442 
3.1 Synchrony Judgments (SJs) 443 
The Anova on SJs revealed a main effect of factor Movement (F(1,39) = 7.581, p = .009, p2 = .163. 444 
Fig. 3, panel A). Participants perceived a congruent movement (mean ± S.E.M., M+: 0.062 ± 0.023) 445 
as more synchronous than an incongruent movement (M-: -0.062 ± 0.023). Interestingly, the factor 446 
Context was also significant (F(1, 39) = 6.052; p = .018, p2  = .134. Fig. 3, panel B): participants 447 
perceived the visual feedback as more synchronous in the free (Free: 0.017 ± 0.007) than in the cued 448 
block (Cued: -0.017 ± 0.007). The main effect of factor Delay was also significant (F(2, 78) = 74.830, 449 
p < .001, p2  = .657. Fig. 3, panel C). This result confirms that participants correctly understood the 450 
meaning of the synchrony judgment question and that they could successfully discriminate increasing 451 
delays, which were all different from each other as confirmed by post-hoc comparisons (Delay(0): 452 
0.250 ± 0.029; Delay(150): 0.015 ± 0.016; Delay(300): -0.264 ± 0.026; all ps < .001; all ds > 1.608). 453 
Importantly, the effects of factors Context and Delay were further explained by a Context x Delay 454 
interaction (F(2, 78) = 5.221, p = .007, p2 = .118. Fig. 3, panel D). Post-hoc comparisons revealed 455 
that participants could discriminate increasing delays in both blocks (all ps < .001 and ds > 1.328, see 456 
Table 1 for mean ± S.E.M for each Context x Delay level). Importantly, feedback was perceived as 457 
more synchronous in the free block than in the cued block at Delay(150) (p = .041, d = 0.367) and 458 
Delay(300) (p < .001; d = 0.354). No difference between free and cued actions was observed when no 459 
delay was introduced after the button press (p = .999). The Anova on SJs did not reveal any other 460 
significant main or interaction effects (all Fs < 2.573, all ps > .083). 461 
-------------------------- 462 






































































Please insert Table 1 about here 466 
-------------------------- 467 
3.2 Judgments of Causation (JoC) 468 
The Anova on JoC revealed three main effects. Firstly, we found a main effect of factor Movement 469 
(F(1, 390) = 28.074, p < .001, p2 = .419. Fig. 4, panel A). Participants expressed higher judgments 470 
of causation when the virtual finger moved in the same direction as the participant s one (M+: 53.070 471 
± 2.942), as compared to the opposite one (M-: 35.907 ± 2.971). Secondly, we found a main effect of 472 
factor Goal (F(1, 39) = 4.446, p = .041, p2 = .102. Fig. 4, panel B). Participants expressed higher 473 
judgments of causation when the virtual hand pressed the virtual button of the selected color (G+: 474 
45.928 ± 2.592), as compared to the other one (G-: 43.048 ± 2.539). Lastly, we found a main effect 475 
of factor Delay (F(2, 78) = 15.463, p < .001, p2 = .284. Fig. 4, panel C). Participants reported higher 476 
judgments of causation for virtual feedback that immediately followed their actions as compared to 477 
delayed feedback. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that the three delays (Delay(0): 52.141 ± 3.432; 478 
Delay(150): 44.509 ± 2.547; Delay(300): 36.815 ± 2.771) were all significantly different (all ps < .020, 479 
all ds > .399), with lower judgments of causation for increasing delays. The Anova did not reveal any 480 
other significant main or interaction effects (all Fs < 3.173, all ps > .083).  481 
-------------------------- 482 
Please insert Fig. 4 about here 483 
-------------------------- 484 
3.3 Judgment Times (JTs) 485 
The Anova on JTs revealed a main effect of factor Delay (F(2, 78) = 14.892, p < .001, p2 = .276. 486 
Fig.5, panel A). Post-hoc analysis showed faster JTs when the delay between action and virtual 487 
feedback was of 300 ms (Delay(300): 0.828 ± 0.016), as compared to delays 0 (Delay(0): 0.865 ±0.017. 488 
p < .001, d = .351) and 150 (Delay(150): 0.880 ± 0.018, p < .001, d = .482). Delays 0 and 150 did not 489 
significantly differ (p = .119). A significant main effect of factor Goal was also found (F(1, 39) = 490 
30.218, p < .001, p2 = 0.437. Fig. 5, panel B). JTs were significantly slower after participants 491 
observed that the goal was missed (G-: 0.871 ± 0.017), as compared to when it was achieved (G+: 492 
0.845 ± 0.016). Importantly, the effects of goal manipulation on JTs were further explained by a 493 
significant Movement x Goal interaction (F(1, 39) = 20.088, p < .001, p2 = .340. Fig.5, panel C). 494 




































































0.829 ± 0.015) as compared to when they observed any of the possible types of erroneous feedback 496 
(all ps < .008; all ds > .272). Moreover, JTs were significantly slower when participants observed a 497 
congruent movement with a missed goal (M+G-: 0.884 ± 0.017) as compared to the other two types 498 
of erroneous feedback, M-G- (0.857 ± 0.017, p = .027, d = 0.244) and M-G+ (0.860 ± 0.018, d = 499 
0.215) respectively, even though the latter difference was only marginally significant (p = .055). JTs 500 
following M-G+ and M-G- observation did not differ (p = .991, d = 0.023). The Anova on JTs did 501 
not show any other significant main or interaction effects (all Fs < 3.885, all ps > .056). 502 
-------------------------- 503 
Please insert Fig. 5 about here 504 
-------------------------- 505 
3.4 post observation Reaction Times (poRTs) 506 
The Anova on poRTs revealed three main effects. Firstly, we found a main effect of factor Movement 507 
(F(1, 39) = 5.317, p = .027, p2 = .120. Fig. 6, panel A) with slower RTs following the observation 508 
of an incongruent (M-: 0.772 ± 0.018) as compared to a congruent movement (M+: 0.768 ± 0.018). 509 
Secondly, the Anova revealed a main effect of factor Goal (F(1, 39) = 5.092, p = .030, p2 = 0.115. 510 
Fig. 6, panel B) with slower RTs in the trial immediately following a missed (G-: 0.773 ± 0.018) as 511 
compared to an achieved goal (G+: 0.767 ± 0.017). Finally, the Anova also revealed a main effect of 512 
factor Context (F(1, 39) = 4.590, p  = .038, p2 = .105): RTs were significantly slower after observing 513 
any type of virtual feedback in the free (Free: 0.784 ± 0.022) as compared to the cued block (Cued: 514 
0.756 ± 0.016). The Anova on poRTs did not reveal any other main or interaction effects (all Fs < 515 
2.121, all ps > .153).  516 
The effect of factor Context suggested that participants were generally faster in performing a button 517 
press in the cued as compared to the free block. To check for this, we compared the reaction times in 518 
the two blocks, without sorting them according to the type of feedback in the previous trial. We 519 
performed this comparison by means of a paired samples t-test on the mean reaction times for each 520 
subject in the two blocks (square root transformation was applied, consistently with other analyses 521 
on RTs). The t-test was significant (t(39) = 2.218, p = .032, d = .247) indicating that participants 522 
performed faster actions in the cued block (Cued: 0.756 ± 0.016) than in the free block (Free: 0.786 523 
± 0.022).  524 
To make sure that the difference between the reaction times in the two contexts could not explain the 525 
pattern of results revealed by the analysis of Synchrony Judgments we performed a correlation 526 




































































Free context participants reported more synchrony and performed actions more slowly, participants 528 
with slower reaction times should also be those reporting the higher synchrony and vice versa. Hence, 529 
for each subject we calculated the mean reported Synchrony and the mean reaction time by averaging 530 
all the conditions and performed a linear correlation of the two measures. Synchrony Judgments and 531 
Reaction Times were not correlated (r = .117; p = .47), suggesting that the effects of our experimental 532 
factors on synchrony judgments were not associated with reaction times. 533 
 -------------------------- 534 
Please insert Fig. 6 about here 535 
-------------------------- 536 
3.5 Control question analysis 537 
To check that participants were aware of the disposition of the colors when they performed a button 538 
press, we conducted an analysis of the control question collected during the SJ session. We calculated 539 
the accuracy for each participant in both free and cued blocks. Participants  responded correctly to 540 
the control question on average 77.3% (± S.E.M: 3.1%) of the times in the free block and 71.1% (± 541 
S.E.M: 2.7 %) of the times in the cued block. We then compared accuracy scores for both free and 542 
cued blocks against chance (50%) by means of two separate one-sample t-tests. Participants were 543 
significantly better than chance both in free (t(39) = 8.891, p  < .001, d = 1.406) and in the cued blocks 544 
(t(39) = 7.917, p < .001, d = 1.252), which suggests that they were aware of the color disposition 545 
when they performed a button press in both free and cued contexts of action.  546 
 547 
4. DISCUSSION  548 
The aim of this study was to investigate the effects of movement and goal-related prediction errors 549 
on implicit and explicit components of SoA within free and cued contexts of action, and if they both 550 
lead to behavioral adjustments. To do this, we modified our recently developed paradigm (i.e., SoA-551 
GAME, Villa et al., 2018) so that both free and cued actions were possible. Participants performed 552 
simple goal-directed actions while they observed similar or different virtual actions represented on a 553 
screen from a first-person perspective. We collected both indirect (i.e., SJs) and direct (i.e., JoC) 554 
measures of SoA. We also measured behavioral adjustments due to the observation of virtual actions 555 
by calculating the amount of time participants took to provide synchrony judgments  i.e., JTs  and 556 
to perform a new action after observation of each type of virtual action  i.e., poRTs. 557 




































































As expected, the analysis of SJs revealed that participants tended to perceive a virtual action as more 559 
synchronous to their own actions when they freely decided which action to perform as compared to 560 
when they followed an external cue (main effect of Context). Specifically, this effect was observed 561 
only when a delay of 150 or 300 ms was introduced between real and virtual action and not when the 562 
virtual action was simultaneous to the button press (Context x Delay interaction). Interestingly, we 563 
did not observe a similar effect in the analysis of JoC, suggesting that implicit, but not explicit SoA 564 
is enhanced by freedom to act. Our findings are in line with recent studies that reported stronger 565 
binding between action and outcome  and hence stronger implicit SoA  in a context of freedom of 566 
choice, as compared to actions performed following external instructions (Barlas et al., 2017, 2018; 567 
Barlas & Kopp, 2018; Barlas & Obhi, 2013; Caspar, Christensen, et al., 2016; Caspar et al., 2018, 568 
2017). In particular, the interaction we found between factors Context and Delay is strikingly similar 569 
to the one reported by Barlas and colleagues (2017). In their case, stronger binding was observed for 570 
free as compared to cued actions, but this effect was observable only when the delays between action 571 
and outcome were longer. Our data suggest that information about the context of actions (free choice 572 
vs environmental demands) may contribute to SoA when evidence in favor of oneself as the cause of 573 
actions is reduced by other factors, such as low temporal contiguity between one s action and the 574 
external consequences. A similar interpretation was provided before to explain the contribution of 575 
active control over movements for the Sense of Ownership (SoO)  i.e., the sense that my body is 576 
my own : information about the executed movements may become relevant only when SoO is 577 
reduced by the observation of a morphologically incongruent limb (Brugada-Ramentol, Clemens, & 578 
de Polavieja, 2019. But see also Burin et al., 2017, 2015 on the role of movements for the SoO). 579 
However, differently from previous studies (Barlas et al., 2017, 2018; Barlas & Kopp, 2018; Wenke 580 
et al., 2010), our data do not support the finding that freedom to act enhances SoA also at an explicit 581 
level. Some methodological differences may account for this. For instance, in previous studies 582 
participants performed actions finalized at producing outcomes in the external environment, such as 583 
eliciting a tone or the appearance of an object on screen. Here, participants observed a virtual action 584 
from a first-person perspective. Hence, it is possible that the manipulations of movement and goal 585 
present in our task may have been more relevant cues to explicit SoA than freedom to act (see section 586 
4.2).  587 
It is unlikely that the effects of freedom to act on implicit SoA may be due to the fact that participants 588 
performed the actions more slowly in the free than in the cued context as revealed by the analysis of 589 
reaction times. As a matter of fact, the significant interaction between Context and Delay found in 590 
the analysis of Synchrony Judgments is not compatible with this interpretation. Indeed, if the 591 




































































would take place only for longer delays between the executed and virtual action, and not also for 593 
virtual actions that were simultaneous to the button press. In addition, we did not find any significant 594 
correlation between Synchrony Judgments and Reaction Times as shown by the analysis reported in 595 
section 3.4.   596 
One could also argue that the effects of freedom to act on Synchrony Judgments could be due to the 597 
fact that participants may have paid more attention to the events taking place in the virtual scenario 598 
when freely choosing which color to press. However, the analysis of the control question (see section 599 
3.5) revealed that participants were better than chance in recognizing changes of the disposition of 600 
the colors in both contexts, suggesting that participants were paying attention to the virtual actions 601 
both when performing actions freely and following cues.  602 
We therefore argue that participants experienced a genuine increase of implicit SoA under a context 603 
of freedom to act.  604 
4.2 Movement-related prediction errors reduce both implicit and explicit SoA, while goal-605 
related prediction errors impair only explicit SoA 606 
In addition to the effects of freedom to act on the feeling of control, our data show that other action-607 
cues contribute to implicit and explicit SoA. Participants perceived a virtual action as more 608 
synchronous to their own when the virtual finger moved in their same direction (M+), as compared 609 
to when the virtual finger moved in the opposite direction (M-, main effect of Movement). In addition, 610 
SJs were reduced when a delay was introduced between the executed and observed action (main effect 611 
of factor Delay). These results partly overlapped with those obtained analyzing JoC. Participants 612 
reported higher control when the virtual finger moved in the same as compared to the opposite 613 
direction and importantly also when the virtual hand pressed the virtual button of the expected color 614 
(G+) as compared to the unexpected color (G-). In addition, participants felt less in control when 615 
longer delays between real and virtual action were introduced (main effect of Delay). Indeed, 616 
movement and the temporal contiguity between action and the resulting effect appear to influence 617 
both implicit and explicit SoA. Our data suggest that information about movement may be a pivotal 618 
source of SoA modulation. This is consistent with previous studies that found that movement 619 
congruency influenced SoA both when indirect (Caspar, Desantis, et al., 2016) and direct measures 620 
of SoA were employed (Daprati et al., 1997; Farrer et al., 2008; Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; Padrao 621 
et al., 2016; van den Bos & Jeannerod, 2002). Our results are also in line with previous studies that 622 
show a reduction of SoA when introducing a delay between executed and observed actions, and 623 
between an action and its outcome (Farrer et al., 2008; Franck et al., 2001; Sato & Yasuda, 2005; 624 




































































information, our data also suggest that the influence of goal achievement may be limited to explicit 626 
SoA. The fact that the failure to achieve the goal of the action did not reduce implicit SoA may be 627 
surprising in light of previous studies that employed intentional binding measures (Barlas & Kopp, 628 
2018; Caspar, Desantis, et al., 2016) and of our previous study (Villa et al., 2018). There, we reported 629 
that the failure to achieve the goal of an action reduced SoA, but only when real and virtual action 630 
took place simultaneously or with a very short delay (+75 ms). Here we did not observe the same 631 
pattern of results, but some methodological differences may account for this seeming discrepancy. 632 
First, in the present study the goal of the action in the cued block was assigned randomly in each trial, 633 
while in our previous study participants were asked to press a button of a cued color (blue/yellow) 634 
for a long series of trials (around 250). Additionally, in this study each type of virtual feedback was 635 
observed an equal number of times (25% of trials), while in the previous study participants observed 636 
a fully correct feedback (M+G+) in 50% of trials, and each type of erroneous feedback (M+G-, M-637 
G+, M-G-) in 16% of trials. Hence, participants to our previous study may have formed a stronger 638 
association between action and outcome that resulted in a higher influence of information about goal 639 
achievement on SoA with respect to the current study. This interpretation is consistent with a cue-640 
integration theory of SoA (Moore & Fletcher, 2012. See below). Moreover, it should also be noted 641 
that other studies failed to find any effect of outcome congruency on intentional binding (Desantis, 642 
Hughes, & Waszak, 2012; Haering & Kiesel, 2014). Whether implicit SoA is modulated by goal-643 
related prediction errors remains an open question that should be further investigated in future studies. 644 
Interestingly, goal-related prediction errors were instead effective in modulating explicit SoA. This 645 
result is in line with previous studies that reported a reduction of explicit SoA for unexpected action 646 
outcomes (David et al., 2016; Kühn et al., 2011; Sato & Yasuda, 2005). That goal information 647 
modulated explicit but not implicit SoA is compatible with the proposal that inferential processes are 648 
involved in the formation of explicit beliefs about control (Synofzik et al., 2008a, 2008b; Wegner & 649 
Wheatley, 1999) and with the fact that individuals tend to view themselves as the cause of successful 650 
outcomes, and to attribute failures to external factors (Arkin et al., 1980; Miller & Ross, 1975). This 651 
result is also in line with the findings of a recent study by Pezzetta and colleagues, who reported that 652 
when participants passively observed a goal-directed action in a fully immersive virtual scenario  a 653 
reaching movement to grasp a glass they experienced more control over the virtual action when the 654 
virtual hand successfully grasped the glass as compared to when it failed to do so (Pezzetta et al., 655 
2018). Importantly, the proportion of failures (75%) was higher than the proportion of successes 656 
(25%), which suggests that individual can experience explicit SoA even when the probability of goal 657 
achievement is low.   658 




































































models that explain how various sources of information contribute to SoA (Moore & Fletcher, 2012; 660 
Synofzik et al., 2008a, 2008b). Moore and Fletcher (2012) proposed a Bayesian model in which 661 
multiple action cues are weighted according to their reliability, i.e. to their effectiveness in identifying 662 
oneself or an external source as the cause of an event. Given our experimental design, the probability 663 
of observing a movement or goal-related prediction error was 50%. This may have different 664 
implications for movement and goal information and for implicit and explicit SoA. With respect to 665 
movement information, participants may have had strong prior predictions about the way the virtual 666 
movement unfolded once they performed the action, since control of one s own body is generally part 667 
of everyday experience. Hence, movement-related prediction errors may have been considered by 668 
participants an effective source of information that could modulate both implicit and explicit SoA. 669 
On the other hand, feeling in control of events in the external environment may require the formation 670 
of a stable association between action and outcome (Moore, Lagnado, Deal, & Haggard, 2009). Given 671 
the high probability of failure in achieving the goal in our task, participants may have considered goal 672 
information as ineffective in modulating their implicit SoA, that may mostly rely on non-conceptual 673 
sensorimotor processes (Synofzik et al., 2008a). Nevertheless, goal-related prediction errors may 674 
have been effective in reducing explicit SoA, which may rely also on conscious thoughts about 675 
causality.    676 
Importantly, our results do not provide support to the possibility that movement and goal-related 677 
prediction errors may exert a different influence on SoA respectively in free and cued actions. Indeed, 678 
we did not find any significant interactions between factors Context, Movement and Goal in SJs or 679 
JoC analyses. Although conclusions from null results should be extremely cautious, it is nonetheless 680 
interesting to note that a similar pattern of results was also reported by Barlas and colleagues (2018). 681 
In their study, freedom to act enhanced SoA, while observation of an unexpected outcome reduced 682 
it, but these two effects did not interact. We extend Barlas and colleagues conclusions by showing 683 
that movement and goal-related prediction errors do not exert a different influence on SoA in free 684 
and cued action. Contrary to our hypothesis, information about achievement of the actions  goal does 685 
not appear to influence SoA more in free as compared to cued actions as suggested by previous studies 686 
(Beck, Di Costa, & Haggard, 2017; Borhani, Beck, & Haggard, 2017). Our results are similar to those 687 
obtained by Caspar and colleagues, who demonstrated that binding between action and outcome is 688 
reduced by the presence of a context of coercion, and it is enhanced by freedom to act irrespective of 689 
whether actions resulted in a more or less severe event for another individual (Caspar, Christensen, 690 
et al., 2016; Caspar et al., 2018, 2017). Thus, our results support the notion that freedom to act itself 691 





































































4.3 Behavioral adjustments follow both movement and goal-related prediction errors 694 
In addition to modulation of participants  SoA, we also found evidence that movement and goal-695 
related prediction errors had an influence on their motor performance. 696 
Participants were faster in providing a Synchrony Judgment (i.e., JTs) when they observed a fully 697 
correct feedback as compared to all types of erroneous feedback (M+G-, M-G+, M-G-, Movement x 698 
Goal interaction). Interestingly, the feedback associated to slower JTs was the one where participants 699 
observed a congruent movement which did not achieve the goal (M+G-). This indicates that goal-700 
related prediction errors affected participants behavior even if the movement was congruent.    701 
Evidence for behavioral adjustments following movement and goal-related prediction errors also 702 
comes from the analysis of poRTs. Indeed, participants were slower in performing a new action after 703 
observing both a failure to achieve the goal of the action and an incongruent movement in the previous 704 
trial. Overall, the analyses of JTs and poRTs suggest that not only SoA, but also participants  behavior 705 
was affected by prediction errors. The slowing observed in both measures may be similar to 706 
behavioral adjustments that occur after a real error, in particular the Post Error Slowing (Danielmeier 707 
& Ullsperger, 2011; Fusco et al., 2018; Ullsperger et al., 2014). Our findings are also in line with 708 
previous evidence suggesting that prediction errors and unexpected action-related visual events (in 709 
our case the observation of congruent or incongruent virtual actions from a first-person  perspective) 710 
lead to behavioral adjustments (Gentsch et al., 2009; Padrao et al., 2016; Wessel & Aron, 2013; 711 
Wessel et al., 2012).   712 
Interestingly, despite movement appeared to be a more relevant cue to SoA as compared to goal 713 
achievement (at least for implicit SoA), the latter appeared to exert a strong influence on behavioral 714 
adjustments, even stronger than movement information as suggested by the analysis of JTs. This 715 
further suggests that the effect of prediction errors on SoA is influenced by other factors, such as the 716 
reliability of a specific action cue (Moore & Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2008a, 2008b). Finally, 717 
we did not find any evidence of a significant interaction between movement and goal-related 718 
prediction errors and free or cued contexts of action. This suggests that erroneous or unexpected 719 
consequences of free and cued actions may lead to similar behavioral adjustments. 720 
  721 
5. CONCLUSION 722 
In this study we investigated the effects of movement and goal-related prediction-errors on implicit 723 
and explicit components of the Sense of Agency and on behavioral adjustments when participants 724 
performed freely chosen and cued actions. Our data support the notion that freedom to act enhances 725 




































































temporal contiguity between one s actions and the external consequences is low. Moreover, our data 727 
indicate that that information about movement execution may be the pivotal cue to both implicit and 728 
explicit SoA, while goal achievement appears to mostly influence explicit SoA. We hypothesize that 729 
the contribution of goal information to implicit SoA may increase in case of a more stable association 730 
between action and outcome (Moore et al., 2009) or in case the goal was endowed with an affective 731 
or rewarding valence (Takahata et al., 2012; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013). Future studies may tackle 732 
these issues. Importantly, our data suggest that the effects on SoA of freedom to act and of movement 733 
and goal-related prediction errors are independent. Finally, we show that movement and goal related 734 
prediction errors may generate behavioral adjustments.  735 
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CAPTIONS TO FIGURES AND TABLES 1004 
 1005 
Fig. 1 Experimental set-up. Participants performed simple goal-directed actions  to select one of 1006 
the two virtual buttons according to its color (blue or yellow) and to press the real button in the 1007 
corresponding position as fast as possible - and observed a virtual hand performing the same or a 1008 
different action from a first-person perspective (panel a). A screen was placed on a wooden structure 1009 
in an inclined position, and a hole at the front of the structure allowed participants to place their hand 1010 
under the screen and hidden from sight. Participants inserted their finger between the two plastic 1011 
buttons of a custom-made response box (panel b), which allowed to collect downward and upwards 1012 
movements. In separate blocks, participants could either freely select which color to press (free 1013 
actions) or follow an imperative cue (cued actions, in the example we show a participant that has to 1014 
press blue). The virtual action could be simultaneous (+0 ms) or delayed (+150, +300 ms) with respect 1015 
to the real button press. We collected Synchrony Judgments and Judgments of Causation expressed 1016 
by means of a Visual Analogue Scale as indirect and direct measure of SoA, respectively 1017 
Fig. 2 Experimental procedure and virtual stimuli. The experiment was divided in two sessions 1018 
(panel A): in the SJ session participants were asked to provide Synchrony Judgments between the 1019 
virtual action and the observed the virtual action. In the JoC session, participants provided Judgments 1020 
of Causation of the virtual action by means of a Visual Analogue Scale. Participants performed the 1021 
two sessions in a fixed order  first the SJ session, then the JoC session. Each session was divided in 1022 
two blocks, whose order was counterbalanced across participants: in the Free  block participants 1023 
performed freely chosen actions, in the Cued  block they followed cues. The structure of each trial 1024 
was identical for free and cued actions (panel B), with the only difference being the type of symbol 1025 
that appeared at the beginning of the trial. In the cued block, a yellow or blue circle instructed 1026 
participants about which color they had to press. In the free block, the circle was half blue and half 1027 
yellow and reminded participants to choose which color to press. The circle remained visible for 1000 1028 
ms and then disappeared. After a random time comprised between 1000 and 1500 ms the two virtual 1029 
buttons flashed for 120 ms, one of them turning blue and the other yellow. Participants pressed the 1030 
real button in the same position as the selected color with an upward or downward movement and 1031 
observed a virtual action  i.e., visual feedback  which took place simultaneously (+0 ms) or delayed 1032 
(+150, +300 ms) with respect to the button press. The visual feedback remained visible for 500 ms. 1033 
After that participants were asked to respond to the agency question (Synchrony Judgments or 1034 
Judgments of Causation). The inter-trial interval (ITI) was 1000 ms. The possible types of visual 1035 




































































yellow is down and the participants presses the blue button. At the center of the panel the four possible 1037 
types of feedback (M+G+, M+G-, M-G+, M-G-) are represented. To the right of the panel we report 1038 
the prohibition signal that participants observed in the cued block if they pressed the wrong button 1039 
(real error) 1040 
Fig. 3 Effects of movement, context and delay manipulations on Synchrony Judgments (SJs). 1041 
The analysis of Synchrony Judgments revealed that participants perceived the visual feedback as 1042 
more synchronous when the virtual movement was congruent with the real one (main effect of factor 1043 
Movement; panel A) and when they performed free as compared to cued actions (main effect of 1044 
factor Context, panel B). Moreover, participants could discriminate delays of increasing duration 1045 
(main effect of factor delay, panel C). Interestingly, participants perceived free actions as more 1046 
synchronous with respect to cued ones when delays of 150 ms or 300 ms were introduced between 1047 
real and virtual actions, but not when virtual actions took place simultaneously (+ 0 ms) (Action Type 1048 
X Delay interaction, panel D). Error bars represent the Standard Error of the Mean in all panels 1049 
Fig. 4 Effects of Movement, Goal and Delay manipulations on the Judgments of Causation 1050 
(JoC). The analysis of JoC revealed three main effects. Participants experienced lower SoA i) when 1051 
they observed that the virtual index finger moved in the opposite direction as compared to when it 1052 
moved in their same direction (main effect of factor Movement, panel A); ii) when the color pressed 1053 
by the virtual hand was not the selected one as compared to when it was the selected one (main effect 1054 
of factor Goal, Panel B); and iii) for longer delays between real and virtual actions (main effect of 1055 
factor Delay, panel C) 1056 
Fig. 5 Effects of movement, goal and delay manipulations on Judgment Times (JTs). The 1057 
analysis of JTs showed that participants were significantly faster in providing a Synchrony Judgment 1058 
when a delay of 300 ms was introduced between real and virtual action, as compared to when the 1059 
delay was of 150 ms or when the virtual action was simultaneous to the real one (+0 ms. Main effect 1060 
of factor Delay, panel A). Moreover, JTs were significantly higher when participants observed that 1061 
the goal of the action was missed as compared to when it was achieved (main effect of factor Goal, 1062 
panel B). This effect was further explained by a significant interaction between factors Movement 1063 
and Goal: participants showed faster JTs when they observed a fully congruent virtual action (the 1064 
virtual index finger moved in the same direction of the participant and pressed the selected color) as 1065 
compared to all the types of erroneous feedback. Additionally, participants showed slower JTs when 1066 
they observed a congruent movement and the goal of the action was missed (M+G-) as compared to 1067 




































































and M-G+ approximated significance (p = .055). Error bars represent the Standard Error of the Mean 1069 
in all panels 1070 
Fig. 6 Effects of Movement and Goal manipulations on post observation Reaction Times 1071 
(poRTs). The analysis of poRTs revealed that participants were significantly slower in performing a 1072 
button press after observing an incongruent as compared to a congruent movement (main effect of 1073 
factor Movement, panel A). Moreover, participants were significantly slower in performing a new 1074 
action after observing that the virtual hand pressed the virtual button of the color they did not select 1075 
as compared to when the virtual hand pressed the selected color (main effect of factor Goal, panel 1076 
B). Error bars represent the Standard Error of the Mean in all panels 1077 
Table 1 The table reports the mean ± Standard Error of the Mean of ipsatized Synchrony Judgments 1078 
for all levels of the interaction between factors Context (Free/Cued) and Delay (+0 ms, + 150 ms, + 1079 




































































CAPTIONS TO FIGURES AND TABLES 1004 
 1005 
Fig. 1 Experimental set-up. Participants performed simple goal-directed actions  to select one of 1006 
the two virtual buttons according to its color (blue or yellow) and to press the real button in the 1007 
corresponding position as fast as possible - and observed a virtual hand performing the same or a 1008 
different action from a first-person perspective (panel a). A screen was placed on a wooden structure 1009 
in an inclined position, and a hole at the front of the structure allowed participants to place their hand 1010 
under the screen and hidden from sight. Participants inserted their finger between the two plastic 1011 
buttons of a custom-made response box (panel b), which allowed to collect downward and upwards 1012 
movements. In separate blocks, participants could either freely select which color to press (free 1013 
actions) or follow an imperative cue (cued actions, in the example we show a participant that has to 1014 
press blue). The virtual action could be simultaneous (+0 ms) or delayed (+150, +300 ms) with respect 1015 
to the real button press. We collected Synchrony Judgments and Judgments of Causation expressed 1016 
by means of a Visual Analogue Scale as indirect and direct measure of SoA, respectively 1017 
Fig. 2 Experimental procedure and virtual stimuli. The experiment was divided in two sessions 1018 
(panel A): in the SJ session participants were asked to provide Synchrony Judgments between the 1019 
virtual action and the observed the virtual action. In the JoC session, participants provided Judgments 1020 
of Causation of the virtual action by means of a Visual Analogue Scale. Participants performed the 1021 
two sessions in a fixed order  first the SJ session, then the JoC session. Each session was divided in 1022 
two blocks, whose order was counterbalanced across participants: in the Free  block participants 1023 
performed freely chosen actions, in the Cued  block they followed cues. The structure of each trial 1024 
was identical for free and cued actions (panel B), with the only difference being the type of symbol 1025 
that appeared at the beginning of the trial. In the cued block, a yellow or blue circle instructed 1026 
participants about which color they had to press. In the free block, the circle was half blue and half 1027 
yellow and reminded participants to choose which color to press. The circle remained visible for 1000 1028 
ms and then disappeared. After a random time comprised between 1000 and 1500 ms the two virtual 1029 
buttons flashed for 120 ms, one of them turning blue and the other yellow. Participants pressed the 1030 
real button in the same position as the selected color with an upward or downward movement and 1031 
observed a virtual action  i.e., visual feedback  which took place simultaneously (+0 ms) or delayed 1032 
(+150, +300 ms) with respect to the button press. The visual feedback remained visible for 500 ms. 1033 
After that participants were asked to respond to the agency question (Synchrony Judgments or 1034 
Judgments of Causation). The inter-trial interval (ITI) was 1000 ms. The possible types of visual 1035 




































































yellow is down and the participants presses the blue button. At the center of the panel the four possible 1037 
types of feedback (M+G+, M+G-, M-G+, M-G-) are represented. To the right of the panel we report 1038 
the prohibition signal that participants observed in the cued block if they pressed the wrong button 1039 
(real error) 1040 
Fig. 3 Effects of movement, context and delay manipulations on Synchrony Judgments (SJs). 1041 
The analysis of Synchrony Judgments revealed that participants perceived the visual feedback as 1042 
more synchronous when the virtual movement was congruent with the real one (main effect of factor 1043 
Movement; panel A) and when they performed free as compared to cued actions (main effect of 1044 
factor Context, panel B). Moreover, participants could discriminate delays of increasing duration 1045 
(main effect of factor delay, panel C). Interestingly, participants perceived free actions as more 1046 
synchronous with respect to cued ones when delays of 150 ms or 300 ms were introduced between 1047 
real and virtual actions, but not when virtual actions took place simultaneously (+ 0 ms) (Action Type 1048 
X Delay interaction, panel D). Error bars represent the Standard Error of the Mean in all panels 1049 
Fig. 4 Effects of Movement, Goal and Delay manipulations on the Judgments of Causation 1050 
(JoC). The analysis of JoC revealed three main effects. Participants experienced lower SoA i) when 1051 
they observed that the virtual index finger moved in the opposite direction as compared to when it 1052 
moved in their same direction (main effect of factor Movement, panel A); ii) when the color pressed 1053 
by the virtual hand was not the selected one as compared to when it was the selected one (main effect 1054 
of factor Goal, Panel B); and iii) for longer delays between real and virtual actions (main effect of 1055 
factor Delay, panel C) 1056 
Fig. 5 Effects of movement, goal and delay manipulations on Judgment Times (JTs). The 1057 
analysis of JTs showed that participants were significantly faster in providing a Synchrony Judgment 1058 
when a delay of 300 ms was introduced between real and virtual action, as compared to when the 1059 
delay was of 150 ms or when the virtual action was simultaneous to the real one (+0 ms. Main effect 1060 
of factor Delay, panel A). Moreover, JTs were significantly higher when participants observed that 1061 
the goal of the action was missed as compared to when it was achieved (main effect of factor Goal, 1062 
panel B). This effect was further explained by a significant interaction between factors Movement 1063 
and Goal: participants showed faster JTs when they observed a fully congruent virtual action (the 1064 
virtual index finger moved in the same direction of the participant and pressed the selected color) as 1065 
compared to all the types of erroneous feedback. Additionally, participants showed slower JTs when 1066 
they observed a congruent movement and the goal of the action was missed (M+G-) as compared to 1067 




































































and M-G+ approximated significance (p = .055). Error bars represent the Standard Error of the Mean 1069 
in all panels 1070 
Fig. 6 Effects of Movement and Goal manipulations on post observation Reaction Times 1071 
(poRTs). The analysis of poRTs revealed that participants were significantly slower in performing a 1072 
button press after observing an incongruent as compared to a congruent movement (main effect of 1073 
factor Movement, panel A). Moreover, participants were significantly slower in performing a new 1074 
action after observing that the virtual hand pressed the virtual button of the color they did not select 1075 
as compared to when the virtual hand pressed the selected color (main effect of factor Goal, panel 1076 
B). Error bars represent the Standard Error of the Mean in all panels 1077 
Table 1 The table reports the mean ± Standard Error of the Mean of ipsatized Synchrony Judgments 1078 
for all levels of the interaction between factors Context (Free/Cued) and Delay (+0 ms, + 150 ms, + 1079 
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